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INTRODUCTION

In Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Construction Company, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a general contractor could force a
subcontractor to accept a contractor’s reduced change orders on
miscalculated estimated quantities—without breaching the
subcontract. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding also yielded
an equitable outcome because the general contractor was not
required to unjustly compensate the subcontractor.1
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Storms
likely leaves Minnesota Department of Transportation
subcontractors concerned. The precedent set by this decision allows
general contractors to pass contract price reductions to their
subcontractors.2 However, there is minimal reason for concern
because the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Storms is narrow.
Further, subcontractors can easily avoid hardship because the
holding informs subcontractors of this worrisome possibility.
This Note begins with a historical introduction to relevant
contract interpretation principles and related construction contract
terminology.3 The Note then presents a chronological overview of
the dispute and subsequent litigation.4 Last, the Note argues that the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding was just,5 the potential future
impact of the holding is minimal,6 and the Minnesota Department
of Transportation’s Standard Specifications for Construction needs
further revision.7
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
A.

American Contract Interpretation – Two Approaches

Literal definitions and formal interpretations initially
constrained contract law jurisprudence.8 Early interpretation of
contractual language centered around the literal meaning of the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Minn. 2016).
See id. at 777–78.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT 221 (1990).
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words and did not consider the parties’ intentions; hence the
interpretation known as “literalism.” 9 Literalists frequently
consulted dictionaries in order to determine whether or not a
certain word or phrase was ambiguous.10 As a result, literalism only
found definitional ambiguity when a word or phrase had “more than
one meaning or grammatical function.” 11 Essentially, literalism
employs a “plain meaning” approach to contract interpretation.12
Unsurprisingly, the literalist approach to contract
interpretation had—and continues to have—many objectors and
objections.13 One of literalism’s biggest limitations is its failure to
account for the intended definitions assigned by the contract’s
parties.14 Literalist-leaning courts only look for definitional
ambiguity, “despite a party’s contention that he understood the
contract to mean something else.” 15 This constrained approach to
contract interpretation, along with a global shift in commerce16 and
shifts in judicial attitudes,17 fostered significant change in contract
law jurisprudence.18
Late 19th century American legal scholars sought to codify the
emerging area of interpretation within contract law.19 Consequently,
two primary schools of thought emerged in the United States:

9. See STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 17–18
(2009).
10. See id. at 18.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 18–19.
14. See id. at 19.
15. Id. (citing Sofran Peachtree City v. Peachtree Holdings, 550 S.E.2d 429, 432
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001)).
16. See P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 15 (5th ed.
1995) (discussing the gradual decline of the belief in “freedom of contract” as an
example of changing social and economic conditions); TEEVEN supra note 8, at 219–
20 (discussing the legal implications of the shift of buyers and sellers as “a close knit
clique of London traders” to “strangers, who were now manufacturers, suppliers,
middlemen and purchasers”).
17. See, e.g., id. (explaining that society became less apprehensive over the
concept of government intervention in contract law).
18. See Morton J. Horowitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 917, 953 (1974) (“[T]he changes in contract law which were necessary
to meet the needs of the newly emerging market economies . . . . [and] also involved
a pervasive shift in the sympathies of the courts.”).
19. See TEEVEN, supra note 8, at 217–18.
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objectivism and subjectivism.20 These two competing perspectives
were famously propagated by Samuel Williston, an objectivist, and
Arthur Corbin, a subjectivist.21 This dichotomy between objectivism
and subjectivism is illustrated in the First Restatement of Contracts
because while Williston was the author, Corbin served as a special
advisor.22
Under Williston’s approach, “the test for determining the
meaning of contract language is not what the parties intended it to
mean but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties
when the contract was entered, aware of all relevant circumstances,
would have thought it meant.” 23 Additionally, Williston’s approach
rejects the notion that opposing parties can introduce demonstrative
evidence on ambiguity if the contract’s “ordinary meaning is
clear.” 24 Williston is perhaps most famous for his emphasis on
interpreting contracts within their “four corners.” 25 Williston’s
treatise emphasizes that the interpretation of unambiguous
contracts occurs on “the face of the agreement.” 26
Although Williston’s objective approach bears some criticism by
scholars,27 it provides two key advantages: simplicity and
predictability. First, Williston’s approach simplifies the process of
contract interpretation because it prioritizes a reasonable person’s
“ordinary meaning . . . over [the parties’] unwritten expressions.” 28
Therefore, a court examining a contract primarily focuses on the
document itself and disregards outside interactions. Second,
20. See id. at 89, 221; see also BURTON, supra note 9, at xiii.
21. See BURTON, supra note 9, at 23, 28.
22. See TEEVEN, supra note 8, at 221; see also Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering
Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 220 (2005).
23. 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:6 (4th ed.).
24. Id. § 30:4.
25. See generally id. § 32:5. The “four corners” refer to each corner of the
document in question, and thus the four corners approach focuses only on what is
said in the contract itself. Id.
26. Id. § 30:6.
27. See Movsesian, supra note 22, at 222–29. Movsesian lists generally four
criticisms held by academics and legal scholars. Id. First, Williston takes an
essentialist view of contract law. Id. Second, Williston shares the classicist’s view of
the inevitability of legal rules. Id. Third, Williston’s essentialism sets him apart from
the theories of new formalists. Id. Fourth, Williston’s work was undertheorized. Id.
28. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context:
Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 50 (2014); see
WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 23, § 30:6.
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Williston’s writings advocate for improved predictability, especially
within a commercial context.29 Because Williston advocated for a
pragmatic logical approach to interpretation30 and handled
contractual ambiguity from the perspective of a reasonable person,31
Williston’s objective approach to contract interpretation is viewed as
a predictable system for interpreting contractual ambiguity.32
Conversely, Corbin endorsed a subjective method for contract
interpretation.33 Corbin had a large impact on the Second
Restatement of Contracts,34 as it is largely based on the writings in
his famous treatise.35 Corbin’s namesake treatise rejects the “plain
meaning” approach taken by Williston and other formalists; instead,
favoring a more liberal approach.36 The touchstone behind Corbin’s
position on contract interpretation held that “the just result was to
determine the actual intention of the contracting parties.” 37 Because
“[t]here is in fact no ‘one correct’ meaning of a word or
expression[,]” as the current Corbin treatise points out, allowing the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent is
preferred.38 Corbin, as furthered in the current treatise bearing his
name, justified his position by arguing that a court using a “plain

29. See Movsesian, supra note 22, at 231.
30. See id. at 213.
31. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 23, § 30:6. See generally Gilson,
Sabel & Scott, supra note 28, at 50 (discussing Williston’s rationalizations of
common law interpretation and exceptions as “purportedly coherent” and able to
be predictably-applied).
32. See Movsesian, supra note 22, at 274.
33. See BURTON, supra note 9, at 29; see also 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 537 (1960) (“[T]he purpose of the law is to give effect to the meaning
and intention of these two parties.”).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
35. See TEEVEN, supra note 8, at 221.
36. Compare CORBIN, supra note 33, § 537 (“There is no single rule of
interpretation of language, and there are no rules of interpretation taken all
together, that will infallibly lead to the one correct understanding and meaning [of
a contract].”), with 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON ET AL., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 607 (3d ed. 1936) (arguing that where the parties have committed
their agreement to a writing, “the standard of interpretation is . . . the ordinary
meaning of the writing to the parties of the kind who contracted at the time and
place where the contract was made, and with such circumstances as surrounded its
making”).
37. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 28, at 51.
38. Id.; 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24:7 (Joseph M. Perrillo
et al. eds. 2017).
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meaning” approach to interpretation is “substituting its own
linguistic
education
and
experience
for
that
of
the contracting parties.” 39
Corbin’s approach—known as the fault approach—is
considered subjective because of its heavy focus on the intentions of
the contract’s parties.40 Unlike the objective approach championed
by Williston, the subjective approach attempts to enter the minds of
the parties to the contract, and then seeks to ascertain what meaning
the parties attached to a particular word or phrase.41 In other words,
the subjective approach attempts to “interpret a contract according
to the shared meaning the parties attached to the contract’s
language,” rather than attaching externally determined meanings.42
Therefore, because Corbin’s interpretative approach fixates on the
parties’ meanings and disregards the plain meaning, it is considered
subjective.43
Compared to more objective approaches, Corbin’s approach
can be more advantageous because subjectivism seeks to uphold the
“freedom of contract.” 44 Because a subjectivist interpretation is not
constrained by plain meaning, contracts consequently get
interpreted—at least ideally—how the parties intended. This allows
the parties to enforce the contract they both believed they were
entering into, without regard to the clarity or word choice of the
document, promoting the notion of “freedom of contract.” 45
Likewise, because subjectivist contract interpretation considers the
possibility that the parties may have attached unconventional
meanings to particular contractual language,46 the parties are not
held to a potentially harsh, alternative but objective meaning.

39.
40.

CORBIN, supra note 38, § 24:7.
See BURTON, supra note 9, at 29; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 34, § 201(2) (enshrining and expanding on Corbin’s fault
approach).
41. See BURTON, supra note 9, at 28–29; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 28, at
50–51.
42. See BURTON, supra note 9, at 28. Burton continues: “[s]ubjectivism calls on
an interpreter to draw inferences as to a party’s mental state from its manifestation
of intention on the basis of all relevant evidence.” Id.
43. See id.
44. See generally id. at 23–24 (explaining objectivism “allows the [legal effect of
a] contract to come apart from the parties’ subjective intentions,” which fails to
uphold the parties’ perceived agreement).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 28. Burton highlights the Second Restatement of Contract’s
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Minnesota’s Approach to Contract Interpretation

Although Corbin’s approach to interpretation was adopted by
the Second Restatement of Contracts,47 Minnesota courts did not
adopt it. Rather, Minnesota courts are reluctant to look beyond the
face of the document and thus interpret contracts in line with
Williston’s objective approach.48
Minnesota courts typically employ a mechanical approach when
interpreting contracts.49 The court first determines whether a
contract is ambiguous or unambiguous.50 Minnesota courts have
stated, “[t]he language of a contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible
to two or more reasonable interpretations.” 51 Minnesota courts have
also established that a contract’s language is unambiguous if “it has
only one reasonable interpretation.” 52 If the contract is
unambiguous, the court decides the case without departing from the
contract’s language.53 In 1965, the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote,
“where the written language of an instrument applied to the subject
is clear . . . it is neither necessary nor proper in construing it to go
beyond the wording of the instrument itself.” 54 The Minnesota
example: where two parties orally agree to invert the meaning of the terms “buy”
and “sell,” the results are quite different under an objective standard (where the
words carry their ordinary meaning) and a subjective standard (where the parties’
stated goals are achieved). Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 34, at § 212, cmt. b, illus.).
47. See id.
48. See Perry M. Wilson, III & Stephen I. Winer, Chapter 12—Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, in CONTRACT LAW IN MINNESOTA 12-1 (Faye Knowles & John
Satorius eds., 1993).
49. See id.
50. See Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Dig. Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 761 (Minn. 2014)
(“Interpreting a contract requires courts to determine if the language is clear and
unambiguous.”); see also Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 525
(Minn. 1990) (citing Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Emp.’s Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d
853, 856 (Minn. 1986)); Wilson, III & Winer, supra note 48, at 12-4.
51. Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 2010) (citing Carlson
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 2008)).
52. Halla Nursery v. City of Chanhassen, 781 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. 2010).
53. See Wilson, III & Winer, supra note 48, at 12-4; see, e.g., Dykes, 781 N.W.2d at
582 (citing Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364–65 (Minn.
2009)); Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, Ltd. P’ship, 683 N.W.2d 267, 271
(Minn. 2004) (citing Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666
N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn. 2003)).
54. Telex Corp. v. Data Prod. Corp., 271 Minn. 288, 294–95, 135 N.W.2d 681,
686–87 (Minn. 1965) (citing Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. City of St. Paul,
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Supreme Court has consistently upheld this established precedent.55
However, if a court finds that a contract is ambiguous, it seeks to
investigate the parties’ intent before issuing a decision.56
C.

Relevant Construction Law Terminology
1.

Change Orders

Seemingly every construction law commentator emphasizes the
notion that changes to initial plans are an inevitable externality in
construction projects.57 As a result, many construction law practice
guides, both commercial and residential, suggest that drafters of
construction contracts include language to address this near
certainty by allowing modification via a process called a “change
order.” 58 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “change order” as either
“[a] modification of a previously ordered item or service . . . [or a]
directive issued by the federal government to a contractor to alter
the specifications of an item the contractor is producing for the
government.” 59 Perhaps a better definition of a change order is,
“[a]ny modification to a construction contract after [the] contract
[has been] award[ed].” 60 Within the context of MnDOT
construction projects, a change order is defined as “[a] written order
240 Minn. 434, 439, 61 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Minn. 1953)).
55. See Halla Nursery, 781 N.W.2d at 884 (citing Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v.
Cty. of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998)); Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 271
(citing Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. General Mills, 470 N.W.2d 118, 123
(Minn. 1991)); Carl Bolander & Sons, Inc. v. United Stockyards Corp., 298 Minn.
428, 433, 215 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn. 1974); Finke v. State, 521 N.W.2d 371, 374
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Fena v. Wickstrom, 348 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984)).
56. See Wilson, III & Winer, supra note 48, at 12-5.
57. See, e.g., 1A PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER &
O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 4:01 (2017) (“Certainty of change is a constant
in the construction process.”).
58. See, e.g., DAVID K. DEWOLF & MATTHEW C. ALBRECHT, 33 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 10:9 (2017-2018 ed. 2017); Minnesota
Attorney General’s Office, Home Building and Remodeling, OFF. OF MINN. ATT’Y GEN.
LORI SWANSON, https://www.ag.state.mn.us/brochures/pubHomeBuilding.pdf
(last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
59. Change Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
60. Henry J. Rowland, The Causes and Effects of Change Orders on the Construction
Process (Nov. 1981) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, Georgia Institute of
Technology) (on file with Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate
School), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/20447.
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. . . covering permissible adjustments, minor changes or corrections
to the Plans, and rulings with respect to defects, omissions,
discrepancies, and intent of the Contract.” 61
One significant subset of change orders is called a “deductive
change order.” Deductive change orders allow for parties within a
construction contract to remove elements of the proscribed work,
thereby decreasing the overall contract price.62 Deductive change
orders are often caused by something called an “underrun,” which
occurs when the cost of an item turns out to be less than what was
originally anticipated.63 Deductive change orders can be used when
a contract owner or general contractor needs to reduce and/or
remove some element of construction.64 Sometimes a quantity of
materials is overestimated or inadvertently miscalculated, as is what
occurred in the dispute between Storms Inc. and Mathy
Construction, discussed later in this Note.65 Although it may appear
that contractors get shortchanged by a deductive change order, the
process allows for efficient contract modification because these
contracts do not need to be completely renegotiated.66
61. MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION 695
(2016),
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/pre-letting/spec/2016/2016specbook.pdf
[hereinafter MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016].
62. JAY M. BERGER ET AL., MICHIGAN CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 5:10 (2016–
2017 ed. 2016).
63. See Brian K. Carroll, The Road Goes on Forever and the Claims Process Never Ends:
An Approach for Success in Handling Texas Department of Transportation Construction
Claim, 13 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 233, 251 (2012) (discussing how the Texas
Department of Transportation handles underruns).
64. BERGER ET AL., supra note 62. See generally WILLIAM SCHWARTZKOPF,
CALCULATING CONSTRUCTION DAMAGES § 8.12 (3rd ed. 2017) (stating that deductive
change orders are an often litigated industry term used in the contractor and
subcontractor context).
65. See, e.g., Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 774–75 (Minn.
2016).
66. See PAUL E. DAVIS, NORTH CAROLINA CONSTRUCTION LAW, § 7:6 (6th ed.
2017) (“Changes clauses are a convenient way for the parties to change the
contract’s scope of work.”); see also BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 57, § 4:1
(“Without the flexibility of clauses that permitted unilateral changes to the work
during contract performance, and payment for work beyond the contractual
undertaking, changes could be made only through bilateral negotiation and
agreement under common-law principles of ‘offer and acceptance.’ That process
was ill-suited to the exigencies of modern construction because of its potential to
disrupt the construction process by sanctioning delay in implementation of changes
until agreement is reached.”). But see BERGER ET AL., supra note 62 (“However, if
the work is reduced by change order, there will be a subtraction of the estimated
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“Changes” versus “Extras” and the Scope of a Contract

As previously established, changes within the context of large
scale construction projects are essentially unavoidable.67
Categorizing and facilitating changes are a commonly litigated issue
within the construction context.68 However, there is an important
distinction between types of change orders: the difference between
the notion of “change” and “extra.” An important and related
concept that will help clarify this difference is “scope.”
The notion of scope is admittedly confusing because it is not
particularly concrete or fact specific.69 Legal writers and
practitioners generally use terminology such as “inside of” and
“outside of” when considering issues related to the scope of a
contract.70 One useful articulation of this concept is that “[c]hanges
‘within the scope’ of the undertaking are presumed to be covered by
the contract.” 71 Conversely, “[c]hanges outside the scope of the
contract are comparable to nonmaterial or partial breaches.” 72
In most modern public works contracts, the scope of the
contract is usually defined either by the municipality’s spec book or
by statute.73 Municipalities and various government entities
frequently utilize standard specifications documents (“spec books”)
to define numerous procedures and potential sources of dispute that
may materialize during the course of a public works construction
project.74 In fact, this practice is so widespread that many cities and

cost and profit of the work from the total contract price. A work deletion and
contract price reduction can have the effect of taking from the contractor the
opportunity to retain the profit it would have realized by completing work more cost
effectively than estimated.”).
67. See Marvin T. Fabyanske, Extras and Changes, in MARVIN T. FABYANSKE &
ROBERT SMITH, ADVANCED CONSTRUCTION LAW IN MINNESOTA 47 (2005); Bruner &
O’Connor, Jr., supra note 57, § 4:1.
68. SCHWARTZKOPF, supra note 64 § 8.12; see Fabyanske, supra note 67; BRUNER
& O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 57, § 4:1.
69. See Fabyanske, supra note 67, at 48–49.
70. See generally BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 57, at § 4:10 (discussing
the implications of the terms “within the scope,” “outside the scope,” “general
scope,” and other terms relating to scope).
71. Id.
72. Fabayanske, supra note 67, at 48.
73. See, e.g., Public Works Contract Change Order Act, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 525/5 (2004); MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, § 1402.3.
74. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR
CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS AND BRIDGES ON FEDERAL HIGHWAY PROJECTS (2014),
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counties,75 as well as the federal government76 and all 50 states,77
employ spec books. Due to technological distribution methods (i.e.
internet publication), most of these documents are easily and readily
available to the public.
In many of these projects’ controlling spec books and statutes,
the conceptual scope is not explicitly or obviously defined.78 The
scope of the contract is therefore implied by other contractual
clauses such as change order clauses.79 Consequently, scope has
become a commonly disputed aspect in construction litigation.
In MnDOT’s 2016 spec book, scope is defined by section 1402.3
labeled “Significant Changes to the Character of Work.” 80 This
section seeks to define two circumstances where changes to a
contract would be considered outside of the scope of the contract.81
The first situation occurs “[w]hen the character of the work as
altered differs materially in kind or nature from that involved or

https://flh.fhwa.dot.gov/
resources/specs/fp-14/fp14.pdf.
75. See, e.g., HENNEPIN CTY. TRANSP. DEP’T, GUIDE TO BIDDING COUNTY ROAD AND
BRIDGE
PROJECTS
14
(2017),
http://www.hennepin.us//media/hennepinus/business/work-with-hennepin-county/contracting-withhennepin/henn-co-biddingguideegram
.docx?la=en (stating MnDOT Standard Specifications for Construction controls);
ST. LOUIS CTY. TRANSP., STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR ROAD AND BRIDGE
CONSTRUCTION
(2017),
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/document%20library/highways/stand
ard_specs/StLC_Standard_Specifications_Manual.pdf; CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS DEP’T
OF PUB. WORKS, STANDARD SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
PUBLIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
IN
THE
CITY
OF
MINNEAPOLIS
(2017),
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/
www/groups/public/@publicworks/documents/webcontent/wcmsp-191951.pdf;
CITY OF MAPLE GROVE, MINNESOTA, GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS (2017),
http://www.maple
grovemn.gov/files/4214/9089/2492/4_-_General_Specifications.pdf; CITY OF
PLYMOUTH, STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR STREET CONSTRUCTION (2014),
http://www.
plymouthmn. gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=9229.
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 74.
77. See infra Table 1.
78. See, e.g., supra note 61, § 1402.3; 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 525/5; MINN. DEP’T
OF TRANSP. 2016,
79. See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, § 1402.
80. Id. § 1402.3.
81. Id.
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included in the original proposed construction.” 82 A modification is
also considered to be outside the scope by MnDOT “[w]hen a major
contract item of work is increased in excess of 125 percent or
decreased below 75 percent of the original Contract quantity.” 83
Other spec books seem to closely mirror the MnDOT provisions.84
With the concept of scope in mind, it is easier to understand the
difference between a change and an extra.
A change, within the context of a construction contract, relates
to contract modifications that are likely, or at least on their face,
within the scope of the contract.85 Bruner and O’Connor on
Construction Law defines a change as, “an alteration to an existing
contract requirement concerning work that is already required to be
done.” 86 Because a change only modifies preconceived elements of
a construction project, under the Minnesota and Washington spec
books, it is likely that a change is within the scope because it is not
“materially [different] in kind or nature from that involved or
included in the original proposed construction.” 87 However, if the
change has a significant monetary difference (i.e. increases or
decreases a contracted item by over 25 percent), the change would
be considered outside the scope.88
Whereas a change modifies an existing contractual element, an
extra is a modification that adds an item to the contract.89 Using the
aforementioned spec book’s definitions of scope, it is likely that
extras would be considered outside the scope since the increase in
cost would exceed 25 percent.90 Because of the potentially
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Compare id., TEX. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR
CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AND BRIDGES 26 (2016),
ftp://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/des/spec-book-1114.pdf,
with
WASH.
DEP’T
OF TRANSP., STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR ROAD, BRIDGE, AND MUNICIPAL
CONSTRUCTION
1–20
(2016),
https://www.wsdot.wa.gov/publications/manuals/fulltext/M41-10/
SS2016.pdf.
85. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 57, § 4:10.
86. Id. § 4:01; see also Change Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
87. MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, § 1420.3; see also WASH. DEP’T
OF TRANSP., supra note 84, at item 1-04.4.
88. See WASH. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 84, at item 1-04.4.
89. Bruner and O’Connor on Construction Law defines “[a]n ‘extra,’ [as] an
addition to the contract involving work that had not been included in the original
agreement.” BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 57, § 4:01.
90. Compare id., with MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 20
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substantial implications of adding non-contracted for work and/or
materials, extras are usually governed by separate spec book
specifications, such as Specification 1402.5 in Minnesota.91
3.

Cardinal Change Doctrine

Also related to questions regarding substantial changes to
construction contracts is the common law doctrine of cardinal
change, which addresses situations where modifications exceed the
scope of the contract.92 Stephen Hess defines “[a] ‘cardinal change’
[as] a change or series of changes that so fundamentally alters the
nature of the contractor’s obligations that its imposition against the
will of the contractor constitutes a material breach.” 93 Put another
way, “[a] cardinal change is a substantial deviation from the original
scope of work that changes the nature of the bargain between the
parties.” 94
Although use of the cardinal change doctrine is fairly common
in the federal context,95 Minnesota case law has only made reference
to the term “cardinal change” in one case: Starry Construction Co., Inc.
v. Hubbard County.96 However, the Starry Contr. Co., Inc. court never
addressed the meaning of the term “cardinal change” because the
dispute was resolved without needing to interpret the term.97
Instead of addressing cardinal change through case law,
Minnesota has essentially codified cardinal changes in government
construction contracts in Minnesota Statutes section 429.041

(affirming that the responsibility falls on the contractor), and WASH. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., supra note 84, at 1-20 (affirming that the responsibility falls on the
engineer).
91. See MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 20.
92. Stephen A. Hess, Annotation, “Cardinal Change” Doctrine in Federal Contracts
Law, 9 A.L.R. FED. 2d 565 (2006).
93. Id. (“A ‘cardinal change’ occurs when an owner contracts for construction
services and then imposes alterations in the work that are so drastic that the
contractor is effectively required to perform duties materially different from those
originally bargained for.”).
94. ThermoCor, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 480, 490 (1996) (citing
Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 799, 808 (1971)).
95. See generally Hess, supra note 92, at 565 (describing how various federal cases
have dealt with the cardinal change doctrine).
96. See Starry Constr. Co. v. Hubbard Cty., No. C9-01-867, 2001 WL 1647344, at
*7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001).
97. See id.

2018]

MNDOT AND THE NARROW NO BREACH SCENARIO

371

subdivision 7, despite not using that precise terminology.98 Under
this statute, changes valued under “25 percent of the original
contract price” are not required to be rebid.99 Provisions in the
MnDOT spec book align with this statute.100
4.

Incorporation by Reference

Another important aspect of construction law jurisprudence is
the concept of “incorporation by reference.” When utilizing an
incorporation by reference clause, subcontract drafters seek to
absorb the provisions of the general contract into the subcontract.101
Perhaps one of the strongest motivations behind using an
incorporation by reference clause is the protection it affords to
general contractors as opposed to subcontractors.102 Despite these
clauses being relatively common in construction contracts, they can
be harmful to subcontractors.103 Subcontractors likely will not see
the general contract, so they are likely agreeing to contractual terms
that they did not negotiate or have a chance to review.104 However,
subcontractors entering into contracts with incorporation by
reference clauses could proactively request to review the general
contract so they can understand where they may be subject to
liability.105
Although incorporation by reference clauses, especially within
the construction context, are infrequently settled by Minnesota
courts, this issue has presented itself in other jurisdictions. An early
example of this occurred in the 1916 United States Supreme Court
case, Guerini Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Construction Co.106 In Guerini, a
dispute arose between a general contractor and subcontractor
originating from a construction delay caused by the contractee (i.e.
the U.S. government).107 The subcontract between the parties

98. See MINN. STAT. § 429.041 subdiv. 7 (2017).
99. Id.
100. Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. 2016).
101. Stanley P. Sklar, A Subcontractor’s View of Construction Contracts, 8 CONSTR.
LAW. 1, 18 (1988).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 18–19.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 240 U.S. 264, 264 (1916).
107. See id. at 265; T. Bart Gary, Incorporation by Reference and Flow-Down Clauses,
10 CONSTR. LAW. 3, 44, 45 (1990) (summarizing Guerini Stone Co. and stating that it
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referred to construction specifications from the general contract;
however the general contractor was attempting to incorporate the
entire contract.108 Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the
general contractor’s position.109 Although the general contract
allowed the contractee to delay construction without liability
because the subcontract only referred to the construction
specifications, the court held that the only admissible elements of
the general contract were the “drawings and specifications . . .
referred to in the sub-contract.” 110
Despite modern contract drafters’ attempts to improve
incorporation clauses, the U.S. circuit courts are decidedly split
when examining the issue.111 Some circuit courts have followed the
Guerini holding by limiting incorporated clauses from general
contracts.112 Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit
have both applied incorporated clauses more broadly.113
D.

Documents and Statutes Governing Public Works Contracts

Sources for potential construction disputes are seemingly
infinite,114 and because municipalities utilizing spec books are
is the leading decision in regard to incorporation by reference).
108. Id.
109. Guerini Stone, 240 U.S. at 283.
110. Id. at 278.
111. See generally Gary, supra note 107, at 44, 45–46 (describing various holdings
related to this issue).
112. See S. Leo Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1024
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Under New York law, incorporation clauses in a construction
subcontract, which incorporate by reference clauses in the prime contract into the
subcontract, bind a subcontractor only to the prime contract provisions relating to
the scope, quality, character and manner of the work to be performed by the
subcontractor.”); see also United States v. Fryd Constr. Corp., 423 F.2d 980, 983 (5th
Cir. 1970); Caldwell v. United States, 407 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Cleveland Elec. Co., 373 F.2d 585, 588 (4th Cir. 1967); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Turner
Constr. Co., 560 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth. v. Norair Eng’g Corp., 553 F.2d 233, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); John W. Johnson,
Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 429 F.2d 764, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
113. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507,
1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Exch. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haskell Co., 742 F.2d 274 (6th
Cir.1984)).
114. See Andrew Fuga, The Structure of the Construction Industry and the Law: The
Balance between the Owner, the Architect, the Construction Manager, and the Subcontractors:
A Look at the Procedure of Large Scale Construction Projects and the Many Legal Issues That
Result, 7 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 47, 47 (2005).

2018]

MNDOT AND THE NARROW NO BREACH SCENARIO

373

seeking to avoid ambiguity and confusion during the bid process,
many of these standard spec books can be hundreds of pages long.115
In most cases, standard spec books outline measurement techniques,
define necessary materials, and address procedures for inevitable
changing conditions, among numerous other potential sources for
confusion.116 These standard spec books attempt to proactively
address foreseeable sources for construction related disputes
between the municipality and bid-winning general contractors. As
this Note will later address, standard spec books do not usually
govern relationships between general contractors and
subcontractors.
Despite intending to address similar situations and serve similar
purposes, the specific procedures in all of these documents tend to
vary.117 Consider the standard spec books of Texas, Minnesota, and
Washington as they address the required period in which the
respective Departments of Transportation may issue change
orders.118
Similar to the Minnesota Department of Transportation’s
(MnDOT) Standard Specifications for Construction (spec book),
the seemingly analogous Texas and Washington documents
explicitly address issues pertaining to change orders, but these
specifications in each of the three documents differ significantly.119
For example, while Texas’s Department of Transportation (TxDOT)
Standard Specifications for Construction and Maintenance of
Highways, Streets, and Bridges explains change order procedures, it
lacks language stating when change orders can and should be
issued.120
In contrast, in the most recent 2016 iteration of MnDOT’s spec
book, Specification 1402 informs contractors that “[t]he [MnDOT]
Engineer reserves the right to make, in writing, at any time during
the progress of the work, such changes in quantities and such
alterations in the work as are necessary to satisfactorily complete the

115. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 74, at 746; MINN. DEP’T OF
TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61.
116. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 74, at 746 (demonstrating that
Standard Specifications include topics such as measurement techniques, necessary
materials and procedures); MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 695.
117. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See TEX. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 84.
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project or for reasons of the Department’s interest.” 121 Similarly,
Washington State’s Department of Transportation’s (WSDOT)
Standard Specifications for Road, Bridge, and Municipal
Construction provides a timetable for the issuance of change
orders.122 Specifically, WSDOT’s spec book states that “[t]he
Engineer reserves the right to make [changes], at any time during the
Work.” 123 Despite both Specifications initially appearing identical,
the MnDOT Specification provides its engineers more flexibility.124
Unlike WSDOT, where change orders can be issued only during
construction, MnDOT inserted the additional word “progress,” 125
making it possible for MnDOT to considerably expand the time
period for issuing change orders by introducing greater ambiguity.
In an attempt to remove ambiguity from contract specifications,
some states specifically legislate change orders on public works
projects, but many of these laws differ in scope and intended
purpose.126 Illinois’ Public Works Contract Change Order Act
mandates that change orders exceeding 50% of the initial contract
price be rebid.127 One commentator, Christopher D. Montez,
suggests in his 2005 Construction Lawyer article criticizing the
Illinois law, that the purpose of this law was to prevent fraudulent
bidding practices.128 Montez describes a practice where contractors
intentionally and severely underbid in order to secure the initial
bid.129 Subsequently, these contractors use “change orders to
increase the contract price so that the contract amount will more
accurately reflect the actual costs for the project.” 130
Florida State has also issued legislation related to change orders
in some public works contracts.131 Florida law permits the practice of

121. MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 19.
122. See WASH. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 84.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Compare MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 19, with WASH. DEP’T
OF TRANSP., supra note 84, at 1–20.
125. Compare MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 19, with WASH. DEP’T
OF TRANSP., supra note 84, at 1–20.
126. See Christopher D. Montez, Illinois’ Public Works Contract Change Order Act
and Similar Statutes from Other Jurisdictions, 25 CONSTR. L. 1, 40, 41 (2005).
127. Public Works Contract Change Order Act, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 525/5
(2004).
128. See Montez, supra note 126, at 40.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See FLA. STAT. § 337.11(9) (2017).
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using change orders to modify public works construction contracts,
requires that change orders be in writing, and institutes a monetary
cap on them.132
Although Minnesota does not have as comprehensive of statutes
as Florida and Illinois, some legislation exists relating to the bid
process for public works construction contracts and construction
contracts in general.133 Similar to Florida law, where change orders
are capped, Minnesota municipalities are allowed to accept change
orders that do not exceed 25% of the original contract price.134
Minnesota municipal law mandates that municipalities award the
contract to the lowest bidder135 or alternatively utilize the “best value
alternative.” 136 Minnesota municipalities are also required to
advertise for bids when projects are estimated to exceed $100,000.137
Minnesota has legislation regarding the construction of public
subsidized housing, which also mandates that bids concerning
projects estimated to exceed $100,000 be properly published and
that municipalities use the “best value alternative” as a substitute for
the procurement method.138 Although Minnesota has legislation
requiring that construction contracts and subsequent change orders
be written, these particular statutes apply only to residential
contractors.139

132. See id.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 429.041, subdiv. 7 (2017) (stating that, in certain cases,
changes to contracts can be made without advertising for bids); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 429.041, subdiv. 2(a) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 429.041, subdiv. 1 (2017) (stating that
contracts may be awarded to the contractor offering the best value and discussing
advertisement of bids).
134. Compare FLA. STAT. § 337.11(9) (2017), with MINN. STAT. § 429.041, subdiv.
7 (2017).
135. MINN. STAT. § 429.041, subdiv. 2 (2017) (“The council shall award the
contract to the lowest responsible bidder.”)
136. MINN. STAT. § 429.041, subdiv. 2a (2017) (indicating that the municipality
must explain the weight of each of the criteria used in reaching their decision not
selecting the lowest bid).
137. See id. (stating that bids must be advertised if the estimated costs are
expected to exceed the amount in section 471.345, subdiv. 3); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 471.345, subdiv. 3 (2017) (indicating the dollar amount referenced in section
429.014, subdiv. 1 is $100,000).
138. MINN. STAT. § 469.015, subdiv. 1, 1a (2017).
139. See MINN. STAT. § 326B.809(a) (2017).
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III. CASE HISTORY
A.

The Initial Dispute

On January 28, 2011, MnDOT opened the bidding process to
general contractors on a project to recondition sections of Highways
44 and 76 in Houston County.140 In their effort to secure the MnDOT
bid, general contractor Mathy Construction Company (“Mathy”)
gathered bids from prospective subcontractors.141 In Mathy’s
subcontractor bid process, Mathy provided prospective
subcontractors with MnDOT’s “Statement of Estimated Quantities”
from the general contract bid, a document quantifying the required
materials for MnDOT’s project.142 Relying on the quantities Mathy
provided as reported in MnDOT’s Statement of Estimated
Quantities, Storms, Inc. (“Storms”) submitted their subcontract bid
to Mathy.143 Because Mathy’s $5,415,097.72 bid beat the MnDOT’s
estimate by $180,216.61 and also beat the competition’s bid by
$1,664,530.29, MnDOT awarded Mathy the general construction
contract.144 Additionally, Storms won the subcontract bid with Mathy
and the parties signed the subcontract on March 22, 2011.145 The
subcontract stipulated that in exchange for a $1,007,890.79 payment
from Mathy, Storms would complete the “excavator and fill work”
on Highways 44 and 76 by May 2011 and August 2011, respectively.146
On May 16, 2011, Storms commenced its work on the MnDOT
project.147 Shortly thereafter, “it quickly became apparent to Storms,
Mathy, and MnDOT that much smaller quantities of material were
required than the amounts listed in the Statement of Estimated
Quantities.” 148 Although Storms completed the necessary work on
May 26, 2011, MnDOT’s engineer notified Mathy that some

140. Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Minn. 2016).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 774; MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TABULATION OF BIDS 1 (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/bidlet/abstract/110015ab.pdf.
145. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774; Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A150484, 2015 WL 7693550, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
146. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774.
147. See id.
148. Id.
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estimated quantities were miscalculated and in June 2011 corrected
the figures in MnDOT’s Statement of Estimated Quantities.149
Five months later, in a November 2011 meeting with Mathy and
Storms, MnDOT notified the contractors that due to the
miscalculations in the Statement of Estimated Quantities, MnDOT
would decrease the general contract price.150 MnDOT advised Mathy
and Storms that it was possible to recover fixed costs contingent on
requisite proof; however, Storms never supplied MnDOT with
evidence of its fixed costs.151
On two separate occasions in early January 2012, Mathy
contacted MnDOT to request full payment based on the initially
agreed upon general contract price.152 Subsequently, MnDOT,
Mathy, and Storms reconvened to address the decreased contract
price, but the parties were unsuccessful in resolving their dispute.153
On May 11, 2012, “MnDOT issued a deductive change order . . .
reduc[ing] [Mathy’s] general contract price by $327,064.42.” 154
Thus, MnDOT issued the change order nearly a year after Storms
commenced construction and approximately nine months after
Storms completed construction.155 The Minnesota Supreme Court
noted that “[c]hange orders. . . result[ing] in a reduction in the
contract price are known in the industry as ‘deductive’ change
orders.” 156
B.

Trial Proceedings

Because Mathy transferred MnDOT’s deductive change order
to Storms, via Mathy’s own change order,157 Storms commenced a
breach of contract suit against Mathy in March 2013.158 Storms

149. See id. at 774–75.
150. Id. at 775.
151. Id.
152. Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A15–0484, 2015 WL 7693550, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015); see also Partial Summary Judgment Order at 6,
Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. 28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL 12631493, at *3
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8, 2014) (finding Mathy contacted MnDOT on January 6, 2012,
and on January 10, 2012).
153. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 775.
154. Id.
155. See Storms, 2015 WL 7693550, at *2.
156. Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 778 n.1.
157. Id. at 775.
158. Storms, 2015 WL 7693550, at *1.
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sought $327,064.42, the amount by which Mathy reduced the
subcontract with Storms (i.e. the amount of MnDOT’s deductive
change order) plus related costs and attorney fees.159
In January 2014, the district court granted Storms partial
summary judgment, finding that Mathy breached the subcontract by
failing to fully pay Storms, while setting aside the determination of
damages.160 In its analysis, the district court examined several
provisions from the subcontract itself and from the MnDOT-issued
spec book.161
Specifically, the district court examined Section 10.A of the
subcontract and MnDOT Specification 1402.2(C).162 Section 10.A
presented the possibility of MnDOT issued changes and required
Mathy to notify Storms of those changes should “any modification
affecting. . . [Storms’] work” occur.163 Additionally, 10.A barred
Storms from acting “inconsistent[ly] with the modifications to the
Specification
1402.2(C)
required
General
Contract.” 164
modifications to the work be issued during the “progress of work.” 165
Consequently, when the court read sections 10.A and 1402.2(C) in
accord, it found that changes “must be made during the progress of
the work or the remaining sentences of the section would not have
been necessary.” 166 Therefore, when Mathy modified the contract
after the work was completed and then subsequently refused to pay
the agreed upon price, Mathy breached the subcontract.167
The issue of damages from the breach was determined at a
bench trial.168 However, the court determined the controlling
MnDOT Specification was 1901, and not 1402, primarily relying on
MnDOT engineer Mark Anderson’s affidavit.169 In Anderson’s
affidavit, he noted that, unlike what occurred in this situation, “1402
159. Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774; Storms, 2015 WL 7693550, at *1.
160. Partial Summary Judgment Order at 6, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co.,
No. 28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL 12631493, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8, 2014).
161. See id. at *2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *3.
167. See id.
168. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and
Judgment at 1, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. 28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL
12631492, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 8, 2014).
169. Id. at 4–5, 2014 WL 12631492, at *2–3.

2018]

MNDOT AND THE NARROW NO BREACH SCENARIO

379

only applies to situations of unforeseen or significant changes.” 170
Anderson further stated that “1901.1 allowed him to modify the
planned quantities after it was determined that the planned quantity
was less than anticipated,” but “under Specification 1903.2(A),
[Storms] is entitled to damages for his fixed costs relating to the
change in the planned quantities.” 171 Because Storms failed to
supply evidence of its fixed costs, the court dismissed Storms’
damages claim.172 A subcontract provision stated that the prevailing
party was entitled to attorney’s fees; thus, the court held that Mathy
(the prevailing party) was entitled to attorney’s fees.173
C.

Court of Appeals Decision

In its 2015 decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s holding that Mathy breached the subcontract, but
reversed the trial court’s determination of damages.174 First, the
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Storms holding that Mathy breached the
subcontract by failing to pay Storms the agreed upon contract
price.175 Similar to the trial court’s analysis, the court of appeals
examined provisions from both the subcontract and the spec
book.176 In its disposition, the court emphasized that while “Section
2 of the subcontract agreement incorporates the general contract
into the subcontract,” when the general contract conflicts with the
subcontract, the subcontract controls under Section 12.177
Paramount to the court of appeals’ holding was the
determination that Section 10.A stipulated “that any changes made
to the project must be made during the progress of the work,” citing
the trial court’s reasoning.178 Because the court interpreted that

170. Id. at 4, 2014 WL 12631492, at *2.
171. Id. at 5, 2014 WL 12631492, at *3.
172. Id. at 11, 2014 WL 12631492, at *6.
173. Id.
174. Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A15-0484, 2015 WL 7693550 at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
175. Id. at *5.
176. Compare id. at *3–5, with Partial Summary Judgment Order at 5, Storms,
Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. 28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL 12631493, at *2 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 8, 2014).
177. Storms, 2015 WL 7693550, at *3.
178. Id. at *4 (“[A]s the district court found, ‘the remaining sentences of the
section would not have been necessary’ unless it was mandatory that the changes
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modifications under Section 10.A “be made during the ‘progress of
work’ rather than after the work was completed,” the court reasoned
that the subcontract’s “plain language” contradicted Specification
1901, thereby rejecting Mathy’s argument that Specification 1901
controlled.179 Therefore, the court held that Mathy breached the
subcontract with Storms because Mathy failed to pay Storms the
stipulated contract price and because of Mathy’s tardy change
order.180
Second, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal
of damages after reasoning that Mathy breached the valid
subcontract with Storms.181 The court further determined that
Storms was entitled to expectancy damages because of Mathy’s
breach,182 but the court declined to explicitly state the amount
Mathy owed to Storms, citing the possibility that Storms “may have
already received some of the amount outstanding.” 183 The court
remanded the case for further determination.184 Mathy then
appealed the decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.185
D.

Supreme Court Decision

In the 2016 appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
Mathy had not breached the subcontract with Storms because the
court found that Specification 1901 applied to the change in the
required quantities, thereby reversing the trial and appellate level
decisions.186 The supreme court employed a sequential method to
interpret the subcontract, unlike the lower courts.187 Under the
were made during the progress of work.”).
179. Id. at *5.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. 2016).
186. See id. at 778.
187. See id. at 776. Compare id., with Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A150484, 2015 WL 7693550 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015) (“plain language”),
and Partial Summary Judgment Order at 5–6, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No.
28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL 12631493, at *2–3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8, 2014) (using plain
language), and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and
Judgment at 5, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. 28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL
12631492, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 8, 2014) (relying heavily on an MnDOT
engineer affidavit).
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sequential approach, the supreme court initially determined which
MnDOT specification was applicable, and then proceeded to find a
contradiction between the applicable specification and the
subcontract’s provisions.188
First, the supreme court determined that the applicable
specification was 1901, and not 1402.189 The court determined that
Specification 1901 controlled in situations where MnDOT
miscalculated an estimated quantity necessitating a correction,
which is precisely what occurred in this case.190 The court reasoned
that Specification 1402 was not applicable because “Specification
1402.1 is triggered only when the ‘details of construction’– the scope
of the work – are altered” and MnDOT only changed a quantity.191
The court determined the Specification 1901 was controlling, and so
it proceeded to examine whether any of the subcontract’s sections
conflicted with Specification 1901.192
Although Storms asserted that Section 10.A contradicted
Specification 1901, the court rejected this argument and ultimately
held that there was no conflict between 1901 and the subcontract.193
As previously discussed, the court concluded Specification 1901
applied to circumstances where MnDOT miscalculated estimated
quantities.194 The court also reasoned that Section 10.A only
pertained to situations where MnDOT sought to modify the extent
of Storms’ work.195 Thus, Mathy had proper justification to alter the
subcontract’s estimated quantities.196 Because Specification 1901
controlled and because there was no conflict between 1901 and the
subcontract, the court held that Mathy did not breach the
contract.197

188. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 776.
189. Id. at 777.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (“We do not read section 10.A and Specification 1901 to be in conflict
because they address different situations. Section 10.A describes how to make
changes to the scope of the work, whereas Specification 1901 governs the procedure
for correcting errors in estimated quantities. The provisions can be read in harmony
with one another.” (citing Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 525
(Minn. 1990))).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 777–78.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision Properly Served Justice by
Preventing a Windfall Victory

The dispute between Storms and Mathy facially appears quite
simple: on one side is a general contractor that was compensated
only for work that was performed, and on the opposing side is a
subcontractor that sought payment for goods and services that were
not delivered.198 Surely the ideal of “freedom of contract” is central
to contract law and society should seek to uphold it.199 However, the
notion of fairness ultimately was the more persuasive contract law
tenet supported by the court in its decision of this dispute. Although
the court commendably rooted its discourse in the relevant
contractual language, it also successfully prevented a windfall victory
for the subcontractor seeking an unjust result.
The notion that parties to a contract should be free to negotiate
the contract’s terms, and those negotiated terms should be upheld,
is a longstanding tradition in American contract jurisprudence.200
Both Williston’s (objectivist) and Corbin’s (subjectivist) approaches
to contract interpretation further advance these premises, despite
conflicting with respect to how the two approaches actually interpret
contracts.201
When Williston and Corbin formulated their respective
approaches to interpretation, both intended to promote a key tenet
of contract law: a contract’s terms negotiated by the parties should
be upheld.202 Recall that Williston’s formal approach to contract
interpretation is considered “objective” because it utilizes a
“reasonable person” standard when seeking to understand the

198. Id. at 774.
199. ATIYAH, supra note 16, at 8 (“[T]he shibboleths ‘freedom of contract’ and
‘sanctity of contract’ became the foundations on which the whole law of contract
was built.”).
200. Id. (discussing that while paternalistic notions surrounding contract law
were characteristic of the eighteenth century, laissez-faire ideals of freedom of
contract started to flourish during the nineteenth century).
201. Compare WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 23, § 30:6, with CORBIN, supra
note 38, §24:7; see also BURTON, supra note 9, at 23, 28.
202. Cf. BURTON, supra note 9, at 23, 28 (explaining that courts look to the prior
negotiation of included terms to aid contract interpretation). Compare WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS, supra note 23, § 30:6, with CORBIN, supra note 33, § 24:7.
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words in a contract.203 Conversely, Corbin’s subjective approach
seeks to enter the minds of the contracting parties in order to
ascertain their intentions.204 Although the “how” behind Williston’s
and Corbin’s approaches to contract interpretation differ, the “why”
remains the same: both Williston and Corbin seek to understand the
true meanings assigned by the parties so that the contract can be
properly enforced according to the parties’ ultimate intent.205
When issuing its opinion in Storms, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the contractual intentions of Storms and Mathy.206
Although the subcontract included language in Section 12 stating
that “[w]here a provision of the General Contract is inconsistent
with the provision of this Subcontract, this Subcontract shall
govern,” the court essentially found that the subcontract’s
incorporation of the provisions from the MnDOT spec book was a
central aspect of the contract.207 The court determined that the
disputed issue, change orders of estimated quantities, was addressed
by Specification 1901.208 As a result, the court did not find
inconsistency between the general contract and the subcontract.209
Because the court found that the spec book incorporation was
central to the subcontract, and because Specification 1901
controlled in situations pertaining to estimated quantity change
orders,210 the court properly honored Storms’ and Mathy’s
contractual intentions.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Storms
advanced notions of justice and fairness by preventing the

203. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 23, § 30:6; see also BURTON, supra
note 9, at 23.
204. See generally CORBIN, supra note 33, §24:7; BURTON, supra note 9, at 28.
205. See BURTON, supra note 9, at 23, 28, 35 (explaining that Williston believed
that the parties’ true meanings were best understood through the plain meaning of
their contract; however, Corbin’s approach advocates for the premise that the true
meaning assigned by the contract’s parties originates from their own
interpretation).
206. See Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. 2016).
207. See id. at 774, 776.
208. See id. at 777 (“Specification 1901 fits the circumstances of this case. It gives
the MnDOT engineer the express power to adjust material quantities when
MnDOT’s estimate is incorrect.”).
209. See id. (“We do not read section 10.A and Specification 1901 to be in
conflict . . . . The provisions can be read in harmony with one another.” (citing
Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. 1990))).
210. See id.
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subcontractor’s recovery of unearned, windfall profits. If the court
had found in favor of the subcontractor, the faultless general
contractor would have been left responsible for contract
modifications caused by the external source, MnDOT.211 In other
words, because of involuntary alterations made to the contract by a
third party (MnDOT), the general contractor (Mathy) would have
been unfairly liable to compensate its subcontractor (Storms)
because the materials were not supplied and the services were not
delivered.
Admittedly, the subcontractor did successfully make a fairness
argument during the initial appeal to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals.212 Storms sought to have the court fully enforce the
negotiated bargain by asserting that it lost out because of
involuntarily forced upon external changes.213 The subcontractor’s
position appears to align with a longstanding touchstone of contract
law: “[a] deal is a deal.” 214 The subcontractor essentially based its
argument on the notion that the agreement should be upheld,215
even though the general contractor negotiated what turned out to
be an unfavorable agreement. While this was a compelling
argument, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that the
subcontractor was not entitled to the compensation it sought
because MnDOT-issued change orders on estimated quantities are
permissible under Specification 1901 in MnDOT’s spec book.216
The Minnesota Supreme Court avoided setting a potentially
problematic precedent. Had the case been decided in favor of the
subcontractor, the general contractor would have been liable to pay
for unsupplied materials and undelivered services. The potential
precedent set would have allowed subcontractors to recover for
deductive change orders even though they do not deserve recovery.
It is possible that such a holding by the court may have also

211. Appellant’s Reply and Response Brief at 16, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr.
Co., No. A15-0484, 2015 WL 5969554 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
212. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 776 (citing Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No.
A15-0484, 2015 WL 7693550 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015)).
213. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 776. See generally Storms, 2015 WL 7693550, at *5.
214. Richard P. Bress, Michael J. Gergen & Stephanie S. Lim, A Deal is Still a
Deal:
Morgan Stanley Capital Group v. Public Utility District No. 1, 2008 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 285, 285 (2008).
215. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 776.
216. See id. at 777.
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incentivized litigious contractors to seek out construction contracts
where quantities are grossly overestimated, since they could have
potentially recovered large sums of money despite supplying
nothing. This alternative holding could have led to a practice where
construction bids would be routinely underestimated, thus creating
additional inefficiency for both the public and private sectors.
When examining the court’s actual holding in Storms purely
from a morality and fairness perspective, justice was properly served.
Storms did not deserve to recover because Storms did not ultimately
provide all of the originally contracted for materials and services.217
Regardless of whether or not the materials and services were
delivered, requiring Mathy to pay Storms for unsupplied materials
and services is unjust. It is difficult to conceive of a situation,
hypothetical or legitimate, where a person or entity is fully
compensated despite not providing the entire quantity of a good;
this exercise becomes even more difficult as the amount or the value
of the goods increases.
While not completely analogous, since the governing contracts
likely differ, big-box retailers are notorious for returning unsold (i.e.
unused) product, despite attempting to accurately estimate how
much product they will actually sell.218 Even though retail and
construction contracts probably significantly differ in terms of
content and language, perhaps the reasons why estimated order
quantities are overstated originates from similar motivations. Similar
to retailers, construction engineers cannot afford stock-out costs due
to an underestimation.219 In other words, there is a major incentive
for engineers to overestimate required materials—they need to
ensure they do not run out because halting construction is very
expensive.220 This is likely why MnDOT overestimated the bid
quantities. Even though Storms asserted that it was entitled to the
bargain it negotiated, Storms should not be paid when it did not

217. See id. 774–75.
218. See, e.g., Robert D. Buzzell, John Quelch & Walter J. Salmon, The Costly
Bargain of Trade Promotion, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 1990), https://hbr.org/
1990/03/the-costly-bargain-of-trade-promotion; Shan Li, A Growing Holiday Pastime:
Returning
Those
Unwanted
Gifts,
L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
26,
2015),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-holiday-returns-20151225-story.html.
219. Compare Buzzell, Quelch & Salmon, supra note 218, with Fredric L.
Plotnick, Understanding and Proving Construction Delay Claims, 2 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW.
67, 67 (1986).
220. See, e.g., Plotnick, supra note 219, at 67.
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perform services or deliver materials because doing so would have
been unnecessary.
This particular change order provision within the MnDOT spec
book seems to essentially serve as a quasi-cancellation clause. As
previously established, alterations in large scale construction
projects are inevitable,221 and there are significant financial
incentives for project designers to overestimate material and service
quantities.222 It is thus reasonable for these contracts to include
language that allows for changes to occur, and to an extent, these
change order provisions appear to serve that function.
B.

Future Impact

The Minnesota Supreme Court set a precedent that a general
contractor on a public works project can pass price reductions from
governmental miscalculations to their subcontractors, regardless of
the subcontractor’s willingness to accept the adjustment or the
initially contracted bid price in the subcontract.223 The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Storms encourages judicial
efficiency despite potentially setting a controversial precedent.
Had the Minnesota Supreme Court found in favor of Storms,
Mathy would have been in a distressing position. Since Mathy would
have been unable to recover the price difference from MnDOT, due
to the general contract’s provisions,224 Mathy would be left with two
unpleasant options. Either Mathy could attempt to recover the loss
from Storms on an unjust enrichment claim for not performing the
entire contract, or worse, Mathy would simply suffer a large
monetary loss of $327,064.24.225
This precedent seems contrary to a central principle of contract
law, “a deal is a deal,” 226 because contracts are typically upheld

221. See Fabyanske, supra note 67, at 47; BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 57,
§ 4:01.
222. See Plotnick, supra note 219, at 67.
223. See generally Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Minn.
2016) (holding that general contractor (Mathy) did not breach its subcontract with
the subcontractor (Storms) when owner (MnDOT) miscalculated estimated
quantities during the initial bid solicitation process).
224. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS
FOR CONSTRUCTION 103 (2005), http://www.dot.state.mn.us/pre-letting/spec/arch
ive.html [hereinafter MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2005].
225. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774.
226. See, e.g., Bress, Gergen & Lim, supra note 214, at 285.
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despite one party agreeing to unfavorable terms.227 While doctrines
exist in contract law for defending against improper contract
formation (e.g., incapacity, duress, undue influence) and excusing
nonperformance (e.g., mistake, unconscionability, illegality),228 it is
unlikely Mathy could have utilized any of them. Presumably, a
contract was properly formed between Mathy and Storms because
neither party disputed this issue throughout litigation.229 Also, there
was no justifiable reason for Mathy’s nonperformance, other than
not being paid by MnDOT.230 At trial, Mathy relied on Section 18.A
of the subcontract, which established that payment from MnDOT
was a “condition precedent” to Mathy paying Storms.231
Nonetheless, the trial court rejected Mathy’s argument because the
court believed Mathy did not exert “good faith” in seeking payment
from MnDOT.232
Contrary to the trial court’s decision,233 Mathy could reasonably
and persuasively argue on appeal that the delay was not solely
Mathy’s fault since MnDOT’s sluggishness played a contributory
role. MnDOT failed to swiftly issue a deductive change order when
shortly after Storms commenced working, “it quickly became
apparent to Storms, Mathy, and MnDOT that much smaller
quantities of material were required.” 234 Additionally, despite the
MnDOT engineer’s affidavit supporting that he could “summarily
change the miscalculated quantities,” MnDOT failed to promptly
227. See, e.g., Winthrop Res. Corp. v. Sabert Corp., 567 F. Supp.2d 1084, 1092
(D. Minn. 2008) (explaining that “the fact that the contract represents a bad deal
for [the defendant] does not excuse” the defendant’s nonperformance (citing
Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346–47 (Minn. 2003))).
228. 8 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, Contracts §§ 6.00–03, 10.21 (6th ed. 2015).
229. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774 (noting the issue of the case was breach of a
valid contract); see also Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A15-0484, 2015 WL
7693550, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
230. See Partial Summary Judgment Order at 5, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr.
Co., No. 28-CV-13-235, 2014 WL 12631493, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8, 2014).
231. Id. at 6, 2014 WL 12631493, at *3 (“According to Section 18.A (2) of the
Subcontract Agreement: Receipt of payment by the Contractor from the Owner
shall be a condition precedent to the right of the Subcontractor to receive payment
unless the failure to have payment shall be solely caused by the fault of the
Contractor.” (emphasis added)).
232. Id. (citing a lengthy delay between Mathy’s final payment request from
MnDOT and MnDOT’s eventual issuance of the change order (i.e. January 10,
2011–May 11, 2012)).
233. See id.
234. Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774.
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issue a deductive change.235 However, it is unreliable to depend on
such a strategy because the trial court had already rejected this
argument.236
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court found Mathy breached the
contract, Mathy’s best option is to bring an unjust enrichment
action; however, this approach for recovery is risky. Minnesota case
law establishes the elements of unjust enrichment as a benefit
conferred by one party to another and retention of that benefit must
be unjust.237 To recover under this rule, Mathy would need to fully
pay Storms the original contract price and then attempt to bring an
action showing that Storms’ retention of the full payment was unjust.
An unjust enrichment action is risky for two reasons. First,
suppose Mathy did bring an unjust enrichment action. Mathy’s
hypothetical argument would then depend on the premise that
Storms was paid for services that it had not performed. But Storms
could easily prevail, arguing that Mathy surely had contemplated an
adjustment to quantities (and thus payment) that were labeled
“[e]stimated.” 238 Second, if Mathy loses the suit, Mathy would have
lost $327,064.42 (the difference between the initial and changed
payment amount) plus litigation costs.239 Because unjust enrichment
actions are a gamble, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
Storms is proper. It set an effective and efficient precedent for similar
situations in the future.
The Storms decision establishes that general contractors can
efficiently pass along payment changes from MnDOT onto their
subcontractors when estimated quantities are miscalculated.240
Contract drafters in the future should be advised to incorporate
clear language contemplating a situation, analogous to Storms, where
MnDOT issues a change order either increasing or decreasing
payment.241
235. Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A15-0484, 2015 WL 7693550 at *5–
6 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).
236. Partial Summary Judgment Order at 6–7, Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co.,
No. 38-CV-13-235, 2014 WL 12631493, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8. 2014).
237. See Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, 820 N.W.2d 826, 838 (Minn.
2012) (quoting ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302,
306 (Minn. 1996)); see also Acton Constr. Co. v. State, 383 N.W.2d 416, 417 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 4 (1973)).
238. Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 774–75.
239. Id. at 774.
240. See id. at 774, 777–78.
241. See id. at 774.
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While subcontractors may feel slighted by the precedent set in
Storms, since they may not get what they bid for, subcontractors
should not feel completely discouraged. Subcontractors may
perceive this precedent as unfavorable since compensation could be
reduced involuntarily. However, the precedent set by Storms is
constrained to contracts incorporating MnDOT’s spec book.242
Additionally, because Storms establishes clear precedent for similar
situations in the future, subcontractors will probably spend less time
and money litigating these types of claims.
Most importantly, Storms demonstrates that unfavorable
outcomes are easily avoidable. In Storms, the subcontract included
the general contract’s provisions and gave the subcontract
supremacy when the general contract and subcontract conflicted.243
In the future, contract drafters should also include language in their
subcontract addressing payment reductions caused by the
contractee’s miscalculation of estimated quantities. Suppose Storms
had included language in the subcontract such as:
Mathy is not entitled to reduce payment to Storms if
MnDOT reduces an estimated quantity for any reason.
Mathy is obligated to increase payment proportionally, if
MnDOT increases an estimated quantity for any reason.
Most likely, a court would have found Mathy breached the
subcontract, thus entitling Storms to recovery. Another potential
solution for subcontractors could be imposing a monetary penalty
when estimated quantities are changed for any reason. Not only are
subcontractors compensated for unexpected alterations, general
contractors and contractees are incentivized to provide more
accurate estimates. Because this issue is foreseeable, subcontractors
on MnDOT projects should include in their subcontracts language
addressing miscalculations of estimated quantities.
C.

MnDOT’s Standard Specifications for Construction Still Needs
Revision

Evidenced by the lower courts’ difficulty interpreting the
applicable specifications and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
subsequent 2016 decision in Storms,244 MnDOT’s spec book is overly
convoluted and therefore should be revised to increase clarity.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 774.
Id. at 776.
See id. at 774.

390

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1

The spec book is long, which is understandable given the
complexities of doing large scale construction; it could benefit,
however, from more concise language. In Storms, the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ approach
where the court of appeals “based its decision on what it called the
‘plain language’ of the subcontract.” 245 Instead, the Minnesota
Supreme Court employed a slightly different two-step “plain
language” approach when correctly deciding the case: first,
determine which spec book specification applies, then see if the
applicable specification conflicts with the subcontract.246 Although
MnDOT engineer Mark Anderson’s affidavit247 proved to be
extraneous in the court’s decision,248 the spec book should be
written more clearly, thereby eliminating the need for MnDOT
engineers to submit explanatory affidavits.
Although MnDOT reduced the 2016 spec book’s page count
considerably, while also improving on clarity,249 some of the
alterations made to the spec book’s specifications still need
improvement. Consider the analogous text from the 2005 spec book
and the 2016 spec book. The 2005 text, labeled “Measurement of
Quantities” states:
The Engineer will adjust the quantities on (P) designated
Contract items when the Engineer revises the dimensions
of that work (in which case only the affected portion will
be re-determined) or when the Engineer decides that the
quantity designated as (P) is incorrect.250
Specification 1901.1, labeled “P” Quantities, in the 2016 spec
book states:

245. Id. at 776.
246. See id.
247. See Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., No. A15-0484, 2015 WL 7693550, at
*5–6 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015) (“[S]pecification 1901 [applies to]
miscalculated quantities . . . . [whereas 1402] applies to . . . unforeseen changes or
abnormalities in the physical conditions at the job site.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
248. See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 775 (referencing the affidavit only early in their
opinion, while addressing the district court’s disposition).
249. Compare MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 695, with MINN.
DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2005, supra note 224, at 1074.
250. MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2005, supra note 224, at 97.

2018]

MNDOT AND THE NARROW NO BREACH SCENARIO

391

The Engineer will adjust a “P” designated quantity if the
Engineer revises the dimensions of the Work or decides the
“P” designated quantity is incorrect.251
Undoubtedly, the 2016 version is shorter and thus easier to
comprehend; however, reorganization and/or section relabeling
would further improve clarity. Suppose Specification 1901 was
reorganized as (1) “Methodology of Measurement,” (2)
“Modification Procedures for Measurements of Quantities,” and (3)
“Measurements of Quantities Definitions.” This suggested
reorganization and relabeling improves Specification 1901
threefold. First, by simply reading each section’s title, a reader can
quickly ascertain what is included in the section. Second, this
proposed reorganization improves general readability and flow by
listing the highly technical definitions last. Third, the proposed
relabeling of sections condenses the overall document for improved
conciseness. For example, the proposed section “Modification
Procedures for Measurements of Quantities” could integrate
Specification 1903 labeled “Compensation for Altered
Quantities.” 252 Since the modification procedures are outlined
before the four-page list of definitions and after the measurement
methodology, the document flows more logically and orderly, thus
improving readability.
Although the 2016 spec book’s text has improved compared to
the 2005 edition, the vague language could still be improved, despite
the spec book’s usage in complex construction projects.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly applied Minnesota
contract law when it utilized an expected mechanical process for
contract interpretation. Initially, the court looked at the
incorporated MnDOT specifications, then decided whether a
subcontract provision conflicted.253 First, the court held, unlike the
lower courts, that MnDOT Specification 1901 controlled in a
situation where MnDOT miscalculated estimated quantities.254
Subsequently, the court correctly determined that Specification

251.
252.
253.
254.
case.”).

MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 2016, supra note 61, at 66.
Id. at 69.
See Storms, 883 N.W.2d at 776.
See generally id. at 777 (“Specification 1901 fits the circumstances of this
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1901 did not conflict with the subcontract’s provisions.255 As a result,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held Mathy had not breached the
subcontract with Storms, by properly applying Specification 1901
and finding no contradictions in the subcontract.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Storms prevented a
windfall victory for an undeserving party. Even though Storms did
not provide the materials and services for which it sought to recover,
Storms attempted to recover for Mathy’s alleged breach of their
subcontract. Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding,
precluding Storms’ recovery, yielded a fair outcome because it would
be unjust for Storms to recover for goods and services it did not
supply.
Although subcontractors are probably and understandably
concerned by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Storms, the
future implications are constrained, informative, and potentially
beneficial. The impact of Storms is limited because the question
decided in Storms arose from a dispute regarding MnDOT’s spec
book, and therefore, does not seem to broadly apply to all
subcontracts. The Storms holding educates future subcontract
drafters how to theoretically avoid similar compromising positions.
Lastly, subcontractors seeking payment from general contractors
due to a MnDOT error will likely avoid lengthy and thus costly
litigation because Storms sets a clear precedent.
The Storms decision demonstrates the unnecessary complexity
of MnDOT’s spec book. Evidenced by the lower courts difficulty
interpreting its provisions, the spec book is excessively complicated.
Although the 2016 edition of the spec book clarified previously
confusing writing to an extent, the changes did not completely
resolve
the complexities, nor does the 2016 edition entirely prevent future
disputes. While the supreme court correctly sorted out the
complicated intricacies, Storms demonstrates that the drafting of
MnDOT’s 2005 spec book was inadequate and was unfortunately
resolved at the expense of Storms and Mathy.

255.

See id. at 777.
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Table 1
State
Specbook Link
Alabama
https://www.dot.state.al.us/conweb/pdf/Sp
ecifications/2012%20DRAFT%20Standard%
20Specs.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5BW7PU4].
Alaska
http://www.dot.state.ak.us/stwddes/dcsspecs
/assets/pdf/aptspecs/airportspecs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QJ3-FG9N].
Arizona
https://www.azdot.gov/docs/business/2008standards-specifications-for-road-and-bridgeconstruction.pdf?sfvrsn=0
[https://perma.cc/2R6F-MGQJ].
Arkansas
https://www.arkansashighways.com/standar
d_spec/2014/2014SpecBook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QRK8-VXC5].
California
http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/oe/construct
ion_contract_standards/std_specs/2015_Std
Specs/2015_StdSpecs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7V5-B8HX].
Colorado
https://www.codot.gov/business/designsupp
ort/cdot-construction-specifications/2011Specs/2011-specs-book/2011-SpecsBook.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/95PUEWQW].
Connecticut http://www.ct.gov/dot/cwp/view.asp?a=228
8&Q=498392 [https://perma.cc/D26MBZ9C].
Delaware
http://deldot.gov/Publications/manuals/sta
ndard_specifications/pdfs/2016/2016_stand
ard_specifications_08-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TVA-J8G6].
Florida
http://www.fdot.gov/programmanagement/
Implemented/SpecBooks/
[https://perma.cc/C6LG-9PBK].
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Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine
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http://www.dot.ga.gov/PartnerSmart/Busin
ess/Source/specs/DOT2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7QV-CXMP].
http://hidot.hawaii.gov/highways/s2005standard-specifications/
[https://perma.cc/2MVK-M83B].
http://apps.itd.idaho.gov/apps/manuals/Sp
ecBook/files/SpecBinder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZAR-MH2S].
http://www.idot.illinois.gov/Assets/uploads
/files/Doing-Business/Manuals-Guides-&Handbooks/Highways/Construction/Standa
rdSpecifications/Standard%20Specifications%
20for%20Road%20and%20Bridge%20Const
ruction%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Y5M-CT39].
http://www.in.gov/dot/div/contracts/stand
ards/book/sep15/sep.htm
[https://perma.cc/F2YS-BUWY].
https://www.iowadot.gov/specifications/Spe
cificationsseries2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GYR-KE5W].
https://www.ksdot.org/burconsmain/specpr
ov/specifications.asp
[https://perma.cc/QHF8-9C9R].
http://transportation.ky.gov/construction/p
ages/kentucky-standard-specifications.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SJ4E-UPQQ].
http://wwwsp.dotd.la.gov/Inside_LaDOTD/
Divisions/Engineering/Standard_Specificati
ons/Pages/Standard%20Specifications.aspx
[https://perma.cc/56L8-2BG8].
http://maine.gov/mdot/contractors/public
ations/standardspec/
[https://perma.cc/PB4B-2N74].
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Maryland

395

http://roads.maryland.gov/pages/sscm.aspx
?PageId=853&lid=SSP
[https://perma.cc/MSF5-LPFF].
Massachusetts http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/highway/D
oingBusinessWithUs/ManualsPublicationsFo
rms.aspx [https://perma.cc/RDC3-3PN7].
Michigan
http://mdotcf.state.mi.us/public/specbook/
2012/ [https://perma.cc/G26Y-L55M].
Minnesota
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/preletting/spec/2016/2016specbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4HF-K399].
Mississippi
http://sp.mdot.ms.gov/Construction/Pages
/Standard%20Specifications.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NK6M-GR2U].
Missouri
http://www.modot.org/business/standards_
and_specs/highwayspecs.htm
[https://perma.cc/7MWU-Q39J].
Montana
http://www.mdt.mt.gov/business/contractin
g/standard_specs.shtml
[https://perma.cc/X6ZT-487Q].
Nebraska
http://dot.nebraska.gov/media/6897/specb
ook-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6WA7ZMW].
Nevada
https://www.nevadadot.com/doingbusiness/contractors-construction/contractservices/standard-specifications-and-plans
[https://perma.cc/B29V-DT75].
New
https://www.nh.gov/dot/org/projectdevelo
Hampshire pment/highwaydesign/specifications/
[https://perma.cc/9Z9U-7DMU].
New Jersey
http://www.state.nj.us/transportation/eng/s
pecs/2007/Division.shtml
[https://perma.cc/523M-37NL].
New Mexico http://dot.state.nm.us/content/dam/nmdot
/Plans_Specs_Estimates/2014_Specs_For_Hi
ghway_And_Bridge_Construction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S87Z-6KYN].
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New York

North
Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South
Carolina
South Dakota
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https://www.dot.ny.gov/main/businesscenter/engineering/specifications/busi-estandards-usc/uscrepository/2016_1_Specs_USC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/542F-JSNR].
https://connect.ncdot.gov/municipalities/B
id%20Proposals%20for%20LGA%20Content
/01%20NCDOT%20Specifications%20Book.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9RP4-RNCJ].
https://www.dot.nd.gov/dotnet/supplspecs/
StandardSpecs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/AA4Z-9GQS].
https://www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/Const
ructionMgt/OnlineDocs/Pages/2016Online-Spec-Book.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P2GW-PZUA].
https://www.ok.gov/odot/Doing_Business/
Construction/Construction_Engineering__Standards,_Specifications,_Materials_and_T
esting/ [https://perma.cc/4X39-E4ZJ}.
http://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/Business/P
ages/Standard_Specifications.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9QEY-CLDW].
http://www.penndot.gov/ProjectAndProgra
ms/Construction/Pages/ConstructionSpecifi
cations.aspx [https://perma.cc/U8XJ-C54P].
http://www.dot.ri.gov/documents/doingbus
iness/Bluebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ALG3-8VSZ].
http://www.scdot.org/doing/construction_S
tandardSpec.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z8B8QKU9].
http://www.sddot.com/business/contractors
/specs/2015specbook/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/559W-PGBQ].
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Tennessee

397

https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/tdot/atta
chments/TDOT_2015_Spec_Book_FINAL_p
df.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ53-VD8S].
Texas
http://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdotinfo/des/spec-book-1114.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DTW9-3JHZ].
Utah
https://www.udot.utah.gov/main/uconowne
r.gf?n=31730316757114651
[https://perma.cc/48E6-5852].
Vermont
http://vtrans.vermont.gov/contractadmin/construction/2011-standardspecifications [https://perma.cc/LQ84RK9M].
Virginia
http://www.virginiadot.org/business/const/
spec-default.asp [https://perma.cc/F9GVRCAE].
Washington https://www.wsdot.wa.gov/publications/ma
nuals/fulltext/M41-10/SS2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E44X-6RVG].
West Virginia http://www.transportation.wv.gov/highways
/contractadmin/specifications/2017StandSp
ec/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q4HR-NS9R].
Wisconsin
http://wisconsindot.gov/Pages/doingbus/eng-consultants/cnsltrsrces/rdwy/stndspec.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KL5P-C8BD].
Wyoming
http://www.dot.state.wy.us/home/engineeri
ng_technical_programs/manuals_publicatio
ns/2010_Standard_Specifications.html
[https://perma.cc/AHE7-8E48].
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